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THE CONTROL OF FOREIGN LOANS AND 
CONCESSIONS IN CHINA 
A Report presented to the Final Settlements Committee of the New York 
Peace Society, July 17, 1918, 
''f By FREDERICK MOORE* 
T HE International Consortium recently operating in China became a noteworthy example of an effort to internationalize government 
loans and concessions at a time when uncontrolled competition 
threatened the welfare of that country and endangered the continuance of 
peace between the Powers. The example is worthy of serious consideration 
because such governments as those which have existed in China are a 
source of injury and injustice to their own people, and competition for 
concessions in such countries is a constant danger to international peace. 
A general statement can be made which is applicable to such states as 
China, Turkey and Persia, showing how conditions in them provoke war. 
In none of these backward states is the government, for any long 
period of time, sufficiently stable to maintain itself in power against rebel-
lion and to protect the country from foreign aggression without foreign 
assistance. It is, therefore, repeatedly the policy of the government in 
power to seek foreign support or protection in one way or another, and 
* Mr. Moore, formerly editor of Asia, writes with knowledge gained during 
a long residence in China. The Final Settlements Committee assumes no re-
sponsibility for the opinions which he holds, but the Publication Committee of 
the Society is confident that his statements will be helpful to those who arc 
studying the problem of administration in backward and disorganized countries. 
it is frequently the policy of the opponents of the existing government, 
· often armed rebels, likewise to seek foreign assistance in order to over-
throw the men who hold the offices. While it is often to the interest of 
one or more Powers to support the existing government, rival Powers 
from time to time support its opponents. 
Foreign financiers and concessionaires, though they generally prefer 
plain business transactions, untrammelled with either domestic or inter-
national politics, constantly find it necessary to involve themselves or 
permit themselves to be involved in politics, either by the government of 
the backward country or by that of their own state. It has been almost 
invariably true, for instance, that the Chinese Government, in giving con-
cessions or making loans to American financiers, has had in view a primary 
domestic or international political motive. Only two years ago an Ameri-
can company obtained from China concessions that were said to be on 
better terms than the Chinese have ever before granted. The object of 
the Chinese Government was not, however, merely the desire to be generous 
to Americans, whom they favor, but to create a situation which would be 
likely to command the attention of the Government of the United States. 
I refer to the Simms-Carey railway contracts; and I give this example 
to show that even a country with as idealistic a policy as that of the 
United States under President Wilson, and even concessionaires who 
sought for practically unentangled business, are made to play political 
parts, and do in one way or another accept those parts.* 
Once the seed of rivalry is sown, the fertilizer is poured upon it 
from various sides and it fructifies rapidly. The concessionaire wishes 
to make his profits and therefore seeks the support of his government, 
while the concessionaires of rival countries invoke the assistance in turn 
of their governments ( as in the instance above cited) to prevent the con-
summation of a concession that conflicts with concessions previously 
granted. Newspapers take up the question, and the rival concessionaires, 
generally backed by their governments, lay their cases before their own 
national publics ; and business men of the nations take up the argument, 
each as a rule advocating the side of its own concessionaires. Yet the 
cause of those concessionaires or financiers may not be the right one. 
In the case of America we have the infamous instance of the Hankow-
* The Simms-Carey contracts were secured in the year 1916, with the active 
assistance of Paul S. Reinsch, the American Minister, to Peking. The con-
cessions were for new lines of railway which conflicted with concessions or 
promises already given to British, French, Russian, and Japanese concession-
aires, and several of these governments protested against the fulfillment of the 
Simms-Carey contracts, which were consequently altered. 
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Canton concession, one of the most shameful episodes of concession mon-
gering on record.* There are also, of course, records of dishonorable 
dealings on the part of British, Russian, French, German, Belgian, 
Austrian and Japanese concessionaires. No nation is lacking in unscnip-
ulous men who can influence considerable capital. 
The reformer with the simple solution to this problem of loans and 
concessions says that none should be contracted, that backward nations 
should be left to work out their own problems. Such a policy of with-
drawal would not be satisfactory even if you could persuade all other 
nations to keep their capitalists away from undeveloped countries, for then 
you would divide the world into two groups, the progressive nations, who 
would continue to progress, and the backward countries that would sink 
deeper into disorder and ignorance. Promotion of large enterprises and 
construction of railways, though accompanied by much dishonesty and 
some bloodshed, have certainly advanced the welfare of the world; and 
many financiers are, like men of other professions, highly honorable and 
some even altruistic. But, apart from this theoretical reasoning, it is 
impossible to keep even our own American promoters, financiers, and 
eni;rineers away from the countries that need and want their services. It 
is, therefore, essential to find a means to control and regulate the danger 
* In 1898 the Chinese Government, anxious to award to an unaggressive 
nation a contract which Belgian concessionaires were striving to wring from 
them in the interests of Russia, gave to Calvin Brice a very liberal contract for 
the construction of the important Hankow-Canton Railway, carefully stipulating 
in a subsidiary agreement that the company should remain entirely American. 
Failing to obtain the concession direct from China, the Belgian financiers planned 
to buy a controlling interest and succeeded in doing so after the death of Brice 
and after Barclay Parsons, the well-known engineer, became President of the 
so-called American China Development Company. The Chinese Government 
protested vigorously, but, as is customary with the Chinese, it preferred to buy 
back the concession rather than fight the legality of the violated clause. J. P . 
Morgan & Co. acted as the American agents in repurchasing the stock held by 
the Belgians, undoubtedly being able to do so only because the defeat of Russia 
by Japan (in 1905) had terminated the Russian ambition to control the railway 
across China. (The road from Peking to Hankow was already under Russian, 
nominally Belgian, control). In spite of the fact that the contract required the 
completion of the road, 740 miles, in five years, the American company had 
constructed only 32 miles and had built earthwork for fifty more. This con-
struction, consuming seven years, had cost, through bad management, indiffer-
ence and graft, $3,000,000. In settlement the company obtained $6,750,000, the 
excess of $3,750,000 being in payment for the so-styled "surrender of valuable 
rights." When Americans speak of dishonesty on the part of Chinese officials, 
the latter sometimes remind them that "squeeze" does not assume the pro-
portions of "graft." 
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and terminate the system of free scrambling for concessions; and, with 
this object in view, the practical beginning that was made in China by the 
International Consortium is notably worthy of study. 
In backward states, such as we are considering, men who are both 
capable and honest seldom attain high office. The practical purpose, one 
might say, duty, of office holders ( with exceptions, of course) is to get 
rich and retain power. Their political opponents, likewise with excep-
tions, are the same sort of men. Those in office seek loans for the conduct 
of state affairs or for improvements, such as railway construction, mining 
enterprises and oil development. Those out of office seek loans for pur-
poses of rebellion, promising to reward their backers with concessions; 
and sometimes the government of one Power or group of Powers, whose 
interests are opposed by the authorities in the backward state, find it 
expedient to give assistance to the rebel party; and this is often the right 
thing to do. 
A notable instance is the case of Mehemet Ali of Egypt, who, with 
the sympathy, if no more, of France, practically freed Egypt from Turkish 
rule and then nearly conquered Turkey, which was only saved by the 
actual intervention of the Powers, nearly causing a general war. British 
aid, under General Gordon, to the Chinese Government in the Taiping 
rebellion, and events in Mexico (both the French intervention which put 
Maximilian on the throne, followed by the threat of the United States 
after our Civil War, and the recent course of the Wilson Administration 
in that country) are other instances. The present administration is now 
enlisted with the Allies in support of a faction in Russia, the object being 
to prevent the Germans continuing in control through the connivance of 
the government in power. 
It is not always the case that corrupt officials of the backward state 
demand and receive bribes from the foreigners for granting concessions 
or making loans. In China they frequently do not. But the Chinese 
official, nevertheless, can obtain his "squeeze" in one of a dozen recognized 
ways. Sufficient money might be borrowed by the Government to con-
struct a railway of, say, 500 miles, but, after all the money is spent, there 
may be only forty miles of roadway and very little rolling stock. A hun-
dred millions might be borrowed for the purpose of stabilizing currency, 
but after the money is gone the currency would remain unsound. Yet the 
Government (probably a new one composed of men who were not in office 
when the first loan was made) would apply for another loan in order to 
complete the railway or renew the attempt to reform the currency; and 
these men would assert, of course, that they are not like their predecessors. 
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It will be seen, therefore, that if a railway is to stand as security for 
the loan, it is essential that the foreign capitalists who supply the money 
shall superintend the construction and control the line until the debt is 
repaid; or if the loan be for, say, currency reform, that foreigners must 
supervise that. And it is also essential that the capitalists have the sup-
port of their own Government, otherwise the loan may be repudiated by 
a new government in the backward state, or a parallel railway line may 
be offered by the new government. The Chinese have threatened but 
have never repudiated a foreign loan; yet it is their practice to grant 
conflicting concessions, contrary to contract. 
The Chinese Government does this in an effort to dislodge the Power 
whose capitalists were first interested, and America and American con-
cessionaires ( as we have seen) as well as Britons, Japanese and others, 
have been parties to political manreuvres of this character.* 
It will be seen how essential it is under such conditions for the great 
Powers to control the granting of concessions and the making of loans 
in backward states. It is idealistic and impracticable to regard states 
whose integrity is already seriously impaired and further threatened, as 
free and independent and deserving of equal loan and concession privi-
leges,-as Mr. Morgan Shuster seemed arbitrarily to regard Persia, and 
President Wilson and Mr. Bryan formerly regarded China. Loans freely 
made to any government or governments in a backward state will bank-
rupt that state in the course of time; and loans will always be made, even 
if the bankers do not offer them of their own free will, through a Power 
or Powers seeking, for political motives or as a means of protection from 
the political motives of others, to control or influence the backward state. 
It has been to the interest of both France and Germany to finance and get 
control of Morocco; to the interest of Britain, France and Germany to 
finance and get control of Turkey; to the interest of Japan, and of Powers 
opposed to her, to finance and control China. An aggressive nation offers 
the money in return for strategic privileges, coaling stations, authority over 
arsenals, or some other important concessions; whereupon it is immediately 
necessary for the rival Power or Powers, whose object may be to preserve 
the independence of the backward state ( as in the present case of Russia) 
to prevent the design; and in order to do so without the conspicuous move-
ment of warships or troops, it is frequently necessary to grant the loan 
which the backward state desires. Bankers are asked by their Govern-
* It will be recal!ed that Secretary Knox tried to support an Anglo-American 
railway concession in Manchuria, in order to save that province for China. His 
plans were thwarted by Russia and Japan. 
s 
ment to make advances, which they do with the guarantee of their Gov-
ernment. 
In the scramble for concessions in China twenty-five years ago, a 
system of spheres of influence was developed by the statesmen of Europe 
in order to lessen the danger of war between the Powers, but the scheme 
seemed definitely to mark out territory for annexation, and promptly led 
to military and naval encroachments and war. The attention of the 
Chinese was drawn to the competition of the Powers for privileges of 
developing the latent wealth of their country, and the Boxer uprising 
resulted, the object being to drive the foreigners out. Four years later 
( 1904) the Russo-Japanese war resulted from a combination of aggres-
sions and concession-seeking by Russia on a truly imperial scale. 
Some time after the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese war, banking 
groups of the three leading lending nations, Britain, France and Germany, 
came to an agreement pledging themselves in future to make no loans to 
China and accept no concessions from her except jointly, each national 
group accepting a one-third share of all such transactions. The govern-
ments, for their part, realizing the dangers of uncontrolled competition, 
agreed to discourage all loans and concessions sought by capitalists outside 
the Consortium. Had the governments not sanctioned the agreement and 
had they refused to aid in its operation, independent German, French, and 
British competition would have nullified its purpose and effect, and China 
would have continued on the downward road, paying constantly increasing 
rates of interest on bonds constantly deteriorating in value, till, as in the 
cases of Morocco, Turkey and Persia, and Egypt under Ismail Pasha, 
bankruptcy resulted. Concessions would probably have been obtained 
from her on the same scale as formerly, many of them being associated 
with political objects. 
The Consortium determined to make loans only for specified purposes 
and to supervise the expenditure of those loans so that they should not be 
applied by the Chinese to other purposes than those for which the money 
was borrowed. The notorious case of appropriations for the Chinese 
Navy, expended on a summer palace with a lake and a marble boat for 
the Empress Dowager, is an indication of what could happen if the ex-
penditures were not supervised by foreigners. The fact that China is now 
nominally a republic would prevent the money being expended upon a 
palace but would not prevent its being squandered through incompetence 
and corruption. Money was to be loaned by the Consortium for practical 
developments, improvements, legitimate expenses, reforms and reorganiza-
tion, not for political or party purposes or for ambitious schemes of no 
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practical valuer such as a vast army, which China is in no position to main-
tain or control. Opportunity for large personal plunder on the part of 
officials,-which is one of the primary purposes for which an army is 
maintained in China,-was to be eliminated as far as the Consortium 
could do so. 
The Consortium would never, of course, have been able to control 
all the banks or include all the governments in the world, so the Chinese 
could always borrow small sums at high rates of interest from independent 
financiers who would not insist on control, some such bankers not caring 
what the officials did with the money and others regarding the Chinese 
as deserving of full control of their own affairs. 
It is important as well as interesting to note that China has never 
maintained a record of her actual income or expenditures; and of the 
important institutions of the Government only those controlled by for-
eigners keep accurate figures. One reason for this is the inability of the 
Chinese to keep systematic accounts on a large scale, and another is that 
accounts make possible the discovery of officials who follow the recognized 
custom, centuries old, of personal appropriations. There are no effective 
laws or system of courts and police in the country to punish peculating 
officials, who, if they are imprisoned, are put there only because their 
political adversaries are in power. The Chinese Government bank is un-
safe for ordinary deposits. Chinese officials themselves place their money 
in the foreign banks established in Peking and the Treaty Ports, deposit-
ing in the Government bank only such funds as they are willing to risk 
sacrificing for the pretence of trust in that institution. The republic has 
not made much progress in shaking off the traditional form of personal 
and paternal government which permitted the Emperor and his viceroys 
to appropriate as they chose, as long as their exactions were not oppressive 
and they gave the people protection in return for taxations. 
When the Consortium made contracts for the constructipn of railways, 
the railways were to stand as security ;* naturally, therefore, it was neces-
sary to see that they were actually constructed and properly operated till 
the loans were pajd off. When loans were for purposes which afforded 
no tangible holding as security,-such as for the payment of troops and 
for currency reform,-it was necessary to obtain as security the hypothe-
* For the past decade the Chinese Government has adhered to the policy 
of owning the new railways that are constructed, granting concessions only 
when compelled by foreign nations to do so, as in the case of the Manchurian 
roads. The Consortium's contracts were for construction and for financing 
railroads on China's behalf. 
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cation of certain definite government revenues. But unless the revenues 
were controlled by foreigners there was danger of the security dwindling 
away. It was necessary, for this reason, and equally for the benefit of 
the Chinese as for the foreign bond holders, that a foreigner should be put 
in control of the hypothecated revenues. 
As the Consortium was under constant and severe criticism, this 
supervision was performed with the utmost consideration for the Chinese, 
even with laxity and ineffectiveness at times. As an outside, independent 
observer with no inherent motive for sympathizing with either side, and 
desiring primarily to see the Chinese people benefited and the danger of 
war terminated, I personally offered voluntary advice to the Chinese to 
accept the Consortium, and to the Legations and bankers to insist on more 
serious and fuller control. 
It is absolutely necessary to subject China to a period of international 
tutelage; otherwise she will remain for a long and dubious period in danger 
of being conquered and subjected by a single Power or divided between 
two or more. 'The process is already at work, and we may have a sub-
stantial f ait accompli presented at the coming peace conference. In the 
past twenty years China has practically lost all of her so-called Depen-
dencies, has submitted to grave encroachments on the provinces of China 
proper, has suffered the contest of three foreign wars on her soil, has been 
through three major revolutions and is at present in the throes of another, 
and ·has suffered serious encroachments on her internal, general sover-
eignty. Foreign troops are established in her principal cities and guard 
one of her national railways. Foreign gunboats patrol the upper reaches 
of the Yangtze River, six days' journey from that river's mouth. American 
troops and American gunboats participate,-and properly, and for the 
benefit of China,-in this infringement of her sovereignty. 
At the request of Secretary Knox, during the Taft administration, 
"The American Group" of banks was formed; and an old promise on the 
part of a Chinese official to give certain railway concessions to Americans 
was revived. Subsequently a loan was made. The primary object was 
not business but politics, the preservation of the integrity and independence 
of China, and the Open Door. The business to be obtained had not been 
sufficient to attract any large American group hitherto, and it was now 
sought by the American bankers at Mr. Knox's special request and with 
the guarantee of the State Department's support. 
It is of importance to note that the financing of China at the rate of 
·s per cent. interest was on a European basis, which was considerably 
lower than the American standard; .therefore, the loans in which the 
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American Group participated were in themselves such that no other 
American bankers could undertake without considerable difficulty.• As 
financial undertakings they were undesirable. The construction of rail-
ways on a percentage-above-cost basis was of course satisfactory, but here 
China was protected as she had never been before, by the Legations, as, 
in a measure, supervisors of the contracts. The Powers were sponsors for 
the bankers they had selected, and recourse to the Legations and beyond 
them to Washington, London, Paris, Berlin, St. Petersburg and Tokyo, 
and to publicity in the press-which has generally served the Chinese well 
-was always open to them. 
I do not mean to contend that the scheme was entirely devoid of 
mei:cenary motives. It was not. The bankers naturally wanted their 
commissions and they wanted to make those commissions as large and to 
keep them as exclusively their own as possible. Accordingly the British-
French-German Consortium objected at first to American participation, 
but the American Group threatened to become a competitor, and this 
circumstance, together with the political pressure Washington was able to 
bring to bear, caused the Consortium to admit the new Group; making it, 
in 1911, one of four Powers. 
Secretary Knox, developing the policy of John Hay, had previously 
proposed the internationalization of Manchurian railways, which are 
owned and controlJed by Russia and Japan, but both these Powers had 
refused to pool their interests. Later, when the Chinese Government 
sought to obtain the so-called Reorganization Loan from the Four-Power 
Group, intending to spend part of the money in Manchuria, Japan and 
Russia obtained admission to the Consortium, which then included six 
Powers. It is significant of the safeguarding value of such internalization 
that these two aggressive countries, Japan and Russia, sufficiently respected 
the power and prestige of the Quadruple Group to refrain from opposing 
it. On the contrary, they sought to become members of it. 
The Consortium had now become highly political and international, 
for Russia and Japan in 1912, even in a greater degree than the United 
States, were not lending nations. France and Britain were the financiers 
of their respective allies, who were expected to borrow money from them 
in order to lend it to China. Thus the whole financing of China was 
* After President Wilson denounced the Consortium in 1913 the State 
Department strove in vain to find other American bankers who would finance 
China, but failed for the reason above stated and also because the Democrats, 
by the President's action, gave new and definite evidence that American financiers 
must invest abroad at their own peril, the American government having no 
continuous foreign policy, and giving the bankers no assurance of protection. 
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obviously lifted above the conditions of secrecy and competition, both these 
dangerous features being obliterated from the safeguarding Consortium. 
Each group of bankers in the Consortium maintained its own special agent 
in China, and these agents were, of course, in close touch with each other 
and with the various Legations. Secrecy among the nations and among 
the banks was impossible, and even secrecy from the press was out of the 
question with six groups of banks and seven governments knowing w_hat 
was going on. It was always to the interest of one or more to make use 
of public opinion. 
Of course the Chinese sought constantly to obtain independent loans 
free from such restrictions as the Consortium imposed. It was the pur-
pose of the Consortium and the Legations to insist upon supervision of 
expenditure over all sums China should in future borrow. The Chinese 
were left at liberty to select their own foreign supervisors, who became 
Chinese employees, the only restriction being that the characters and 
ability of the supervisors should meet with the approval of the banks and 
legations. There was an unfortunate but not serious feature in the desire 
of each interested country to obtain a share of the appointments to these 
advisory positions. 
When the reorganization Loan of $125,000,000 was made (in 1912) 
for the purpose of disbanding the revolutionary army and reorganizing the 
new republican government, one of the conditions imposed by the Six 
Powers was that foreigners should control the expenditures, in order to 
see that the soldiers were actually paid off and sent to their homes, and 
not dismissed without money and left to organize brigand bands.• Many 
such bands, some numbering thousands of men, had already taken to mur-
der and plunder. In 1911-12, the City of Nanking was five times looted 
by Chinese soldiers, as first the Southern and afterwards the Northern 
army captured and recaptured it. 
Another requirement of the Consortium,-and this is worthy of par-
ticular notice,-was that an expert, together with a Chinese official, should 
be appointed to the joint control of the Salt Gabelle-the revenue from 
that tax serving as a security for the repayment of the loan. Sir Richard 
Dane, formerly an Indian government official, was recommended to the 
Chinese, who accepted him; and the Gabelle, disorganized by the revolu-
tions, immediately began to assume a stable character. When the Euro-
pean war began, the Gabelle proved to be the salvation of the existing 
Chinese Government, as the following amazing record will show. Prior 
• Because the supervision was not sufficiently drastic, the army was never 
disbanded. 
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to 1913, when the reorganization was begun, the Chinese Government had 
no records to show what its revenue was from this important tax, which 
in the following year became its first source of income. An English 
official estimated that the tax had once paid approximately $20,000,000 
annually; a Japanese estimate put the highest annual income at $11,000,000. 
It dwindled to less than $5,000,000 during the revolutions (I give this figure 
from memory), when the majority of the provinces withheld remittances 
from Peking. Sir Richard Dane's success was due to his personal in-
tegrity, ability and character. A less strong and experienced man would 
have been defeated by Chinese obstruction; but Sir Richard proved him-
self a loyal and able servant of the Chinese, willing to tolerate neither 
corruption in them, nor unfairness to them on the part of the banks, some 
of which, practicing ordinary human methods, always read contracts in 
their own favor. 
Sir Richard organized a Salt Police force, which put a stop to much 
of the smuggling. He created a sort of Civil Service, making the position 
of Chinese employees secure if they were loyal and honest, and insecure 
if otherwise. With the assistance of only a score of foreign supervisors, 
he so reorganized the Gabelle that the net return to the Government in 
1915, ~he second year of his labors, after the entire expense of administra-
tion had been deducted, was nearly $40,000,000. 
This sum was far more than what was required for the security of the 
loan and the Chinese Government was, as always, in serious need of funds . 
Not contemplating so rapid or large an increase in this revenue, the 
Chinese had agreed in the loan contract that the banks should hold the 
revenues as security for the payment of interest and amortization. Some 
of the banks wished to retain the full sum of this increased revenue. Sir 
Richard, however, insisted that they hand over to the Chinese Government 
the surplus beyond the sums necessary for security; and the banks were 
unable to withstand the international pressure he was able to bring to 
bear. I give this as an instance of the value of international control of 
contracts. 
Although evidence of the stabilizing influence of foreigners in high 
authority was not lacking, the Maritime Customs and the Post Office being 
noteworthy examples of · long standing, Chinese officials persistently ob-
jected to the employment of other foreigners on the grounds of encroach-
ment upon their independence.* At the same time minor English and 
* The Chinese object also to the Customs and Post Office Inspectors General, 
who were imposed on them by the governments of Britain and France re-
spectively. 
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American bankers denounced as unfair and discriminating the restrictions 
by which a few banks possessed the privilege of making loans to China. 
The British got over some of the hostility by expanding their Group and 
admitting a large number of British banks; the Germans obeyed their 
government's orders; the French Government prevented outside French 
loans by refusing to allow them to be listed on the Paris Bourse, which 
had also the effect of reducing Belgian and other loans to a minimum. 
But the propaganda of the Chinese and certain Americans in the United 
States had its effect in 1913 when the Democratic Administration came 
into power and President Wilson denounced the Consortium as an unfair 
and unjust limitation of the authority of an independent nation. The 
pledges given by Secretary Knox to the American Group were withdrawn, 
which made it impossible for that Group to keep its agreement with the 
other Groups, for other American banks were now to have the assistance 
and encouragement of the State Department in making uncontrolled loans 
to China in competition with the Consortium. The withdrawal of the 
American Group left the Consortium a Five-Power Group, which operated 
as such for another year till the present war began. It was then no longer 
possible for the European nations to finance China, and the State Depart-
ment succeeded in finding no American Group that would do so except on 
a political basis. The Chinese were, therefore, unable to obtain further 
loans and to make further concessions requiring much capital, except with 
Japanese bankers. 
It is no doubt President Wilson's object, in requesting J. P. Morgan 
& Co. to reconstruct an American Group to finance China, to substitute 
international influence for a single national control, the latter method 
being one of the dangerous conditions. It is possible, of course, that the 
League of Nations, which President Wilson advocates, may not be formed; 
and with this possibility in view Japan might be compelled in self-defense, 
if for no other purpose, to take control in China before aggression comes 
again from Europe. China cannot and will not defend herself. 
The Consortium was a sincere effort on the part of a league of nations 
to support China and put her on a sound financial basis. Its greatest 
weakness was its failure to secure control. The scheme was the work of 
practical men who knew China and had worldly wisdom and experienc~, 
and some of them were men of fine scruples, and, what is more, high 
training in honesty. I know most of them personally and several of them 
intimately. The Consortium's program ought to have been proclaimed 
as altruistic and along lines of international control by a league of nations, 
but the attitude of the world was not yet ripe for the acceptance of this 
principle, which President Wilson has now come to advocate. -r:he gov-
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ernments concerned would have done well to make their policies publicly 
known by a measure of proper and dignified press-agenting; but almost 
the only publicity the Consortium got was from the pens and tongues of 
critics. Most of the critics were Chinese, whose pride rebelled, as it 
always will, at being placed under control and tutelage; some of them 
were Americans who knew no better than to think that all financial and 
diplomatic schemes must be evil; and some were mere promoters and 
jealous rival bankers. It was the political business of the Democratic 
party to win the election of 1912 by depicting Republican policies in bad 
colors, and the Democrats obtained from such critics much of their in-
formation regarding "The American Group," who had gone into China at 
the specific request of Secreatry Knox, with the purpose of developing 
the international project, co-ordinating and controlling the competitive 
foreign interests and lending America's support to the protection of that 
country. The Republican party made the mistake of appealing for sup-
port on the basis of American interests and commerce. This, to many 
Americans, was only another name for Wall Street and Big Business and 
did not win their sympathy. 
The scheme had its faults. It is impossible to create any interna-
tional program that will be perfect and work exact justice to all nations 
and each man or group of men. The foremost, perhaps, of the flaws in 
the scheme was that it stifled free competition, which is a principle that 
the trading nations and their merchants have set up. But the interna-
tional advantages to China and to the world far outweighed the injustice 
to these promoters and capitalists who were not included in the selected 
banking groups. 
It is a recognized and proper privilege of one administration to undo 
the work of another when that work has been proved unsound, or when 
the new administration has been elected upon contrary principles; but in 
changing its policies it is wise to heed the precedents of diplomatic usage. 
The American Government had entered into agreements with six other 
Powers, who at least had the right to be heard, whatever may be said 
about the claims of the Taft Administration to consideration at the hands 
of the Democrats. At any rate, those other nations, even if not permitted 
to explain their intentions and interests in China, ought certainly to have 
had warning of the coming condemnation of their efforts. But the new 
Administration's denunciation of the Consortium came without consulta-
tion and without notice, and ran the risk of working injury to China. For-
tunately, President Wilson is now willing to return to the Consortium ar-
rangement, being satisfied, evidently, that adequate safeguards can be 
provided. 
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The following is the public statement issued by the State Department 
on July 29, 1918, after the Administration had decided to revive the Con-
sortium: 
"China declared war against Germany very largely because of the 
action of the United States. Therefore this Government has felt a special 
interest in the desire of China so to equip herself as to be of more specific 
assistance in the war against the Central Powers. Until the present time 
the engagement of the United States in preparing to exert effectively its 
strength in the European theatre of war has operated to prevent specific 
constructive steps to help realize her desires. Recently, however, this 
Government felt that because of the approach of the scenes of disorder 
to Chinese territory, a special effort should be made to place proper means 
at the disposal of China. Consequently, a number of American bankers, 
who had been interested in the past in making loans to China and who had 
had experience in the Orient, were called to Washington and asked to 
become interested in the matter. The bankers responded very promptly 
and an agreement has been reached between them and the Department of 
State which has the following salient features: 
"First: The formation of a group of American bankers to make a 
loan or loans and to consist of representatives from different parts of the 
country; 
"Second: An assurance on the part of the bankers that they will 
co-operate with the Government and follow the policies outlined by the 
Department of State; 
"Third: Submission of the names of the banks who will compose the 
group for the approval of the Department of State ; 
·'Fourth: Submission of the terms and conditions of any loan or 
loans for approval by the Department of State; 
"Fifth: Assurances that if the terms and conditions of the loan are 
accepted by this Government and by the Government to which the loan is 
made, in order to encourage and facilitate the free intercourse between 
American citizens and foreign states which is mutually advantageous, the 
Government will be willing to aid in every way possible and to make 
prompt and vigorous representations, and to take every possible step to 
insure the execution of equitable contracts made in good faith by its citi-
zens in foreign lands. 
"It is hoped that the American Group will be associated with bankers 
of Great Britain, Japan, and France. Negotiations are now in progress 
between the Government of the United States and these governments, 
which it is hoped will result in their co-operation and in the participation 
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by the bankers of those countries in equal parts in any loan which may be 
made. 
"Besides the warlike conditions which confront China on her northern 
and western borders, there is a further incentive to co-operate with all 
these governments, because the war has created a community of interest 
between them and their citizens and those of other governments, and has 
broken down barriers which once have existed and has made easier the 
intercourse between them. It is hoped that, if the project succeeds, it 
will serve as an agency through which this community of interest and the 
consequent expansion of our mutual interests abroad may be adequately 
and properly expressed." 
The original American Group included J. P. Morgan & Co., the 
National City Bank, the First National Bank, and Kuhn, Loeb & Co. The 
new Group recently organized includes twenty-six American banks, all, 
probably, that can legitimately be expected to compete for Chinese loans 
and all that desire to participate. 
If, out of sentimental instead of practical consideration for the Chinese, 
and from a false idea of putting them on their mettle and of treating 
them with the dignity of a fully independent state, the new Consortium 
gives the present temporary Peking government large sums of money 
without effective foreign control, we are liable to do the Chinese people and 
their country serious, and possibly, at this critical time, irreparable injury. 
But on the other hand there is splendid opportunity, if the occasion 
is seized in a statesmanlike way, to use the revived Consortium as one 
of the factors in an international program for a general understanding and 
agreement with regard to China. The interests of Britain (with her 
Pacific Colonies, Australia, New Zealand and Canada), of France, of the 
United States and of China are similar. The declared policies of these 
countries and Japan are the same-namely, the preservation of the inde-
pendence and integrity of China. It is necessary only to coordinate the 
alliances and declarations that already exist and to unify them in order to 
protect China. Merely to give this backward state protection, however, is 
not sufficient; a measure of active temporary interference in her affairs 
is necessary for the purpose of lifting her above the condition of incom-
petence and temptation to other nations. A general international treaty 
in line with President Wilson's program for a league of nations will 
give to many of the statesmen of Japan a joyful relief, because it should 
protect them from either an unwelcome necessity, or a seductive tempta-
tion to create by the mastery of China, one of the greatest empires in 
the world. 
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realized, more or less, that, so long as it retains what is known as the 'Com-
mand of the Sea,' we cannot be invaded." 
This sentence of Mr. Fiennes would during this war be equally true in 
the mouth of any· American. 
The history of sea power to the Briton is the history of the evolution of 
his own League of Dominions. It is a wonderful story here unrolled from 
the defeat of the French at Sluys and of the Spaniards in the Great Armada 
down to the throttling of Napoleon Bonaparte and now of his Potsdam imi-
tator. 
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